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Choosing Between Regulation 33(7) and 33(9) Redevelopment

Writer: Vikrant D. Shetty
Vikrant D. Shetty
Aug 25
11 min read

Updated: Aug 26

Choosing Between Regulation 33(7) and 33(9) Redevelopment

An old, cessed building in South Mumbai and a cluster of ageing structures spread across an entire layout in the suburbs both qualify, in principle, for redevelopment under Mumbai's planning regulations, but they do not qualify under the same regulation, and the choice between them carries very different consequences for FSI, consent thresholds, and who ultimately controls the project. Regulation 33(7) and Regulation 33(9) of the Development Control and Promotion Regulations for Greater Mumbai, 2034 (DCPR 2034) address two structurally different redevelopment situations, and conflating them is one of the more consequential mistakes a society, a landowner, or a developer can make at the outset of a project.


Two Distinct Redevelopment Frameworks Under DCPR 2034


Regulation 33(7): The Standalone Cessed Building Route

Regulation 33(7) governs the reconstruction of cessed buildings in the Island City, meaning buildings constructed before 1940 (with some categories extending later) that have historically paid repair cess to the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Authority (MHADA) for their upkeep through its Mumbai Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board. It also covers certain old buildings belonging to the Municipal Corporation. The defining feature of this route is that a single building, or a single plot with its existing structure, is redeveloped in isolation. The regulation permits Floor Space Index (FSI) of 3.0, or the FSI required to rehabilitate existing occupants plus an incentive component of 50 to 70 percent, whichever produces the larger permissible area, against a base FSI that would otherwise be around 1.0 to 1.33 for the zone. In exchange for this substantially enhanced FSI, the developer is required to hand over a portion of the resulting surplus built-up area to MHADA as additional housing stock, a condition the Bombay High Court has upheld as a valid quid pro quo for the enhanced development rights, reasoning that a developer who avails of the higher FSI cannot then resist the obligation attached to it.


Regulation 33(9): The Cluster Development Scheme Route

Regulation 33(9), by contrast, governs the reconstruction of clusters of buildings under an Urban Renewal Scheme, formally described as a Cluster Development Scheme (CDS). Rather than a single structure, it contemplates the consolidated redevelopment of multiple contiguous buildings, or an entire defined area, potentially spanning tenanted structures, self-occupied buildings, cessed buildings, and non-residential structures together, provided the aggregated plot meets a minimum area threshold: 4,000 square metres in the Island City and 6,000 square metres in the suburbs and extended suburbs. The incentive FSI under a cluster scheme is typically calculated as 55 percent of the rehabilitation area, applied across the combined layout rather than building by building, and the scheme is explicitly designed to support planned, area-wide urban renewal rather than piecemeal reconstruction.


Why Does the Regulation 33(7) Versus 33(9) Distinction Matter?


Single Society vs Multi-Building Governance

The practical difference in scale changes almost everything about how a project is executed. A Regulation 33(7) redevelopment is typically driven by a single co-operative housing society or a group of occupants of one building, negotiating with one developer under a straightforward development agreement. A Regulation 33(9) cluster scheme, because it spans multiple buildings and often multiple ownership interests, frequently involves MHADA as a participant rather than a bystander. Under the DCPR, MHADA is empowered to jointly implement a cluster redevelopment scheme together with landowners or co-operative housing societies, including on freehold private land, and MHADA has in practice used this power to float e-tenders inviting developers to execute cluster schemes where a sufficient majority of residents support the initiative, even displacing a private developer's prior, informal arrangements with individual occupants.


That precise scenario reached the Supreme Court in Lakhani Housing Corporation Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [2025 INSC 489]. A private developer had spent several years and a substantial sum pursuing redevelopment of a 11.2-acre freehold layout of twenty-five dilapidated buildings in Mumbai, having obtained individual agreements from residents, before MHADA issued an e-tender to carry out the same redevelopment as a cluster scheme under Regulation 33(9), with the support of the co-operative housing societies concerned. The developer challenged MHADA's jurisdiction to proceed by way of a writ petition. The Supreme Court held that MHADA could lawfully participate in a Regulation 33(9) cluster scheme jointly with landowners or housing societies even on freehold, privately owned land, that a writ petition was not the correct remedy to enforce what were, at best, unregistered and legally unenforceable contractual arrangements with individual occupants, and that a developer in that position was confined to an ordinary civil remedy such as a suit for specific performance, not a challenge to MHADA's e-tender under Article 226 of the Constitution.


The Displacement Risk Unique to Cluster Schemes

The Lakhani ruling illustrates a structural risk specific to Regulation 33(9) that has no real equivalent under Regulation 33(7): a developer who has invested time and money securing individual consents from occupants across a cluster of buildings, but has not converted those consents into registered, legally binding agreements, can find the entire project redirected to a different developer through MHADA's own tender process, with no writ remedy available to stop it. Under a standalone Regulation 33(7) redevelopment, by contrast, MHADA's role is generally confined to its supervisory function over cessed buildings through the Repair Board, and the risk of an intervening MHADA-led tender displacing an existing developer arrangement does not arise in the same way.


Consent Thresholds and Timelines Compared


Assembling Consent Across One Building vs Many

Consent thresholds also differ in emphasis, though both routes now converge on a broadly similar numerical standard. Redevelopment of a cessed building under Regulation 33(7) currently requires the consent of 51 percent of eligible occupants, reduced from the 70 percent that applied under the earlier 1991 regulations. A cluster scheme under Regulation 33(9) similarly requires majority consent, but because it spans multiple buildings, that consent has to be secured and demonstrated across each constituent structure or a sufficiently representative proportion of the overall layout, which is administratively more demanding to assemble and easier for a dissenting minority within one building to complicate, even where the layout as a whole overwhelmingly supports the scheme.


Why Do Cluster Redevelopment Schemes Move Slower?

Timelines diverge for similar reasons. A single-building Regulation 33(7) redevelopment can, in a straightforward case with a cooperative society and willing occupants, move from consent to sanctioned plans considerably faster than a cluster scheme, which typically requires reconciling multiple societies, multiple sets of occupant records, and, where MHADA is involved as a joint implementing authority, an additional layer of governmental process around the e-tender and joint venture structure itself. Developers and societies choosing between the two routes should treat this difference in administrative complexity as a genuine cost of the larger incentive FSI a cluster scheme can offer, not an incidental delay.


Tenanted buildings within either scheme raise a further point of overlap that is easy to miss. Where a cessed or clustered building houses tenants protected under the erstwhile Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act framework (now succeeded by the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, 1999), disputes over rehabilitation entitlements, alternate accommodation during construction, or the terms on which a tenant is expected to vacate can end up before the Court of Small Causes rather than being resolved purely through the redevelopment consent process. A developer or society proceeding under either Regulation 33(7) or Regulation 33(9) should anticipate that tenancy disputes may run on a separate track from the planning approval process, and that resolving the DCPR consent threshold does not necessarily resolve an individual tenant's underlying occupancy rights.


When a Cessed Building Is Absorbed Into a Cluster Layout

A further point of controversy arises where a cessed building forms part of a larger area that otherwise qualifies for a cluster scheme. The DCPR does not prevent a cessed building from being folded into a Regulation 33(9) layout, and in fact many cluster schemes in the Island City are specifically designed to absorb multiple cessed structures within a wider redevelopment footprint. Where that happens, the FSI and consent mechanics that apply are those of Regulation 33(9), not Regulation 33(7), even though the individual building would have separately qualified for the standalone cessed route. A society that assumes its building will automatically retain Regulation 33(7)'s FSI entitlement once absorbed into a larger cluster proposal is often mistaken, and the two sets of numbers, FSI of 3.0 under a standalone scheme versus 55 percent incentive FSI on the rehabilitation area under a cluster scheme, can produce materially different outcomes depending on the specific configuration of the layout.


How Should a Society Choose Between Regulation 33(7) and 33(9)?

Choosing between the two routes, where a choice genuinely exists, generally comes down to three practical questions: whether the building can achieve viable redevelopment economics on its own under Regulation 33(7), whether neighbouring structures are willing and eligible to combine into a cluster large enough to meet the 4,000 or 6,000 square metre threshold under Regulation 33(9), and whether the society or landowner is prepared to accept MHADA's participation as a joint implementing authority in exchange for the larger cluster-wide incentive FSI. A standalone building with strong redevelopment economics rarely benefits from folding itself into a slower, more administratively complex cluster process, while a building that cannot achieve viable economics alone may have no realistic alternative to combining with its neighbours.


Regulation 33(7) vs Regulation 33(9): Key Differences

Aspect

Regulation 33(7)

Regulation 33(9)

Scope

Single cessed building or old Corporation building, Island City

Cluster of buildings across a defined layout, city-wide

Minimum area

No minimum cluster threshold (single plot)

4,000 sq. m (Island City) or 6,000 sq. m (suburbs/extended suburbs)

FSI available

3.0, or rehab FSI plus 50-70% incentive, whichever is higher

Incentive FSI of approximately 55% of rehabilitation area

Consent threshold

51% of eligible occupants

Majority consent, assembled across each constituent building

MHADA's role

Supervisory, through the Repair Board (cessed buildings)

Can act as joint implementing authority, including via e-tender

Typical project speed

Faster, single negotiating party

Slower, multiple societies and governmental process


Frequently Asked Questions


What is the core difference between Regulation 33(7) and Regulation 33(9) of the DCPR 2034?

Regulation 33(7) governs the standalone redevelopment of a single cessed building or old Corporation building in the Island City. Regulation 33(9) governs the consolidated redevelopment of a cluster of buildings across a larger layout meeting a minimum plot area, potentially combining tenanted, self-occupied, cessed, and commercial structures together.


What FSI is available under each regulation?

Regulation 33(7) permits FSI of 3.0, or the FSI needed to rehabilitate existing occupants plus an incentive of 50 to 70 percent, whichever is higher. Regulation 33(9) typically permits incentive FSI of 55 percent of the rehabilitation area, calculated across the combined cluster layout.


Can MHADA take over a redevelopment project from a private developer under Regulation 33(9)?

MHADA can participate jointly with landowners or co-operative housing societies in implementing a cluster scheme, including on freehold private land, and may issue an e-tender for that purpose. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in the Lakhani Housing Corporation case, a private developer with only unregistered agreements with individual occupants generally cannot use a writ petition to block MHADA's e-tender process, and must instead pursue an ordinary civil remedy.


What consent percentage is required for redevelopment under Regulation 33(7)?

The current requirement is consent from 51 percent of eligible occupants, reduced from the 70 percent threshold that applied under the earlier 1991 Development Control Regulations.


Does a cessed building automatically keep its Regulation 33(7) FSI entitlement if it is absorbed into a larger cluster scheme?

No. Once a cessed building is incorporated into a Regulation 33(9) cluster layout, the FSI and consent mechanics applicable to the cluster scheme govern the project, not the standalone Regulation 33(7) entitlement the building would have had on its own.


Why do minimum plot area thresholds matter for cluster redevelopment?

Regulation 33(9) requires an aggregated plot of at least 4,000 square metres in the Island City or 6,000 square metres in the suburbs and extended suburbs. A layout that falls short of this threshold cannot proceed as a cluster scheme and must instead pursue redevelopment building by building under whichever standalone regulation applies to it.


How do tenancy disputes interact with the choice between Regulation 33(7) and Regulation 33(9)?

Protected tenants in either a cessed building or a cluster layout may have occupancy rights that are litigated separately before the Court of Small Causes, and satisfying the DCPR consent threshold for redevelopment does not, by itself, resolve an individual tenant's underlying rights or entitlement to rehabilitation.


Does Regulation 33(7) apply to buildings outside the Island City of Mumbai?

No. Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR 2034 is confined to cessed buildings and certain old Municipal Corporation buildings situated within the Island City of Mumbai. Structures in the suburbs or extended suburbs that need redevelopment fall outside this route and must instead proceed under the applicable suburban redevelopment or cluster regulations, including Regulation 33(9) where the cluster area threshold is met.


Can a developer with informal occupant agreements block MHADA's cluster redevelopment tender?

Generally, no. Following the Supreme Court's ruling in Lakhani Housing Corporation, a developer holding only unregistered, informal agreements with individual occupants cannot invoke Article 226 to restrain MHADA's e-tender for a Regulation 33(9) cluster scheme. Such a developer is confined to an ordinary civil remedy, such as a suit for specific performance, rather than a writ petition challenging MHADA's participation.


What happens to a developer's investment if MHADA takes over a project through a cluster scheme tender?

A developer who has spent time and money securing individual, unregistered consents risks losing the project entirely if MHADA issues a competing e-tender under Regulation 33(9) with the support of the co-operative housing societies concerned. Recovering that investment ordinarily requires a civil suit against the parties who breached the informal arrangement, not a challenge to MHADA's statutory tender process.


What happens to occupants' rehabilitation entitlements if a Regulation 33(9) cluster scheme is abandoned partway through?

Occupants who have already vacated under a cluster scheme that later stalls or is abandoned generally retain a contractual right to alternate accommodation, rent, or rehabilitation as set out in their individual agreements or the scheme's permission conditions, and can pursue the developer or the implementing authority through civil proceedings or, where MHADA is involved as joint implementing authority, through appropriate administrative or contractual remedies against MHADA and its appointed developer. A stalled scheme does not extinguish these entitlements, but recovering them in practice often requires litigation, which is one of the real risks occupants take on when consenting to a large cluster redevelopment.


Does a cessed building's society need the Repair Board's approval before appointing its own developer under Regulation 33(7)?

The society's redevelopment proposal under Regulation 33(7) of the DCPR 2034 is processed through the Mumbai Building Repairs and Reconstruction Board, MHADA's arm responsible for cessed buildings, since the building has historically paid repair cess to that Board. While the society and occupants choose and negotiate with their own developer, the Repair Board's role in confirming the building's cessed status, its structural condition, and compliance with the applicable consent and documentation requirements is a necessary part of the approval process before the redevelopment can proceed under this regulation.


Can a Regulation 33(9) cluster scheme combine buildings located partly in the Island City and partly in the suburbs?

Combining zones is unlikely as a practical matter, since Regulation 33(9) of the DCPR 2034 sets different minimum aggregated plot area thresholds for a cluster scheme, 4,000 square metres in the Island City and 6,000 square metres in the suburbs and extended suburbs, reflecting the different planning frameworks that apply in each zone. A cluster layout would ordinarily need to sit within a single zone to have its area, FSI, and consent requirements assessed under one consistent standard, rather than straddling both zones under a single application.


Does a dissenting occupant within a Regulation 33(7) or 33(9) redevelopment retain any right to refuse to vacate the premises?

A dissenting occupant does not have an unlimited right to block redevelopment once the required consent threshold, 51 percent under Regulation 33(7) or the equivalent majority under Regulation 33(9), has genuinely been obtained and the scheme has received the necessary sanctions, since Indian redevelopment law is built around majority consent rather than unanimity. A dissenting occupant can, however, challenge whether the consent was validly obtained, whether their own rehabilitation and alternate accommodation entitlements are being honoured, or raise a tenancy dispute before the Court of Small Causes where applicable, rather than simply refusing to vacate indefinitely.


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Vikrant D. Shetty | Vikrant D. Shetty leads the Real Estate and Property Law Practice at the Mumbai-based law firm - Vikrant D. Shetty & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors.


This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice specific to your situation, please seek direct consultation with an advocate.

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