The NCLAT's 45-Day Limit and When Condonation Still Works

An appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal against an order made under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must be filed within forty-five days under section 61(2), a limit the Supreme Court has held cannot be extended once the condonable period expires. An appeal against an order under the Companies Act, 2013 follows a different clock, forty-five days extendable by a further forty-five under section 421(3), for an outer limit of ninety days. Confusing the two clocks is a costly mistake. This post sets out where each clock starts, what condonation can do, and what an in-house team should have in place before an adverse order is pronounced.

Two Appellate Regimes, Two Different Clocks

Both regimes send an aggrieved party to the same forum. Section 61(1) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code) opens with a non obstante clause: notwithstanding anything to the contrary in the Companies Act, 2013 (the Companies Act), a person aggrieved by an order of the adjudicating authority under Part II may appeal to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Section 421(1) of the Companies Act does the same for orders made under that Act. The forum is identical. The clocks are not.

Feature	Appeal against an order under the Code	Appeal against an order under the Companies Act
Forum	National Company Law Appellate Tribunal	National Company Law Appellate Tribunal
Statutory basis	Section 61, Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016	Section 421, Companies Act, 2013
Base period	Thirty days	Forty-five days
Extension on sufficient cause	Not exceeding fifteen days	Not exceeding a further forty-five days
Absolute outer limit	Forty-five days	Ninety days
Time runs from	Pronouncement of the order	The date a copy of the order is made available to the person aggrieved
Further appeal to the Supreme Court	Section 62 of the Code: forty-five days, extendable by fifteen	Section 423 of the Companies Act: sixty days, extendable by sixty

Can the NCLAT Extend the Thirty-Day Period Beyond Fifteen Days?

Section 61(2) requires an appeal to be filed within thirty days, with a proviso allowing the Appellate Tribunal to admit an appeal filed later if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause, but such period shall not exceed fifteen days. Those closing words are the whole of the difficulty. Beyond day forty-five there is no discretion left to exercise.

National Spot Exchange Ltd. v. Anil Kohli [2021 SCC OnLine SC 716] settled the point at the top. A delay of forty-four days beyond the condonable period was refused, and the Court held that such a delay cannot be condoned even in exercise of the power under Article 142 of the Constitution. Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee [2025 INSC 639] restated it in 2025: once the prescribed and condonable periods expire, the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal, whatever the reason for the delay. In May 2026 the Appellate Tribunal declined to condone a delay of one day beyond forty-five, notwithstanding difficulties with the e-filing portal.

Forty-Five Plus Forty-Five Under the Companies Act

Section 421(3) gives forty-five days from the date on which a copy of the order of the Tribunal is made available to the person aggrieved, with a proviso permitting a further period not exceeding forty-five days on sufficient cause. Two differences follow. The outer limit is ninety days rather than forty-five, and time runs from availability of a copy rather than from pronouncement.

The trap is practical. A company facing an oppression petition under section 241 and a section 7 application under the Code in the same quarter has two matters before the same bench, and the diary entries must be built on different rules. Counsel who carries the Companies Act habit into an insolvency appeal will be a fortnight late before anyone notices.

Why the Limitation Act Does Not Rescue a Late Appeal

Section 238A of the Code provides that the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals before the adjudicating authority, the Appellate Tribunal, the Debts Recovery Tribunal or the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. That import is real, and sections 12, 14 and 18 do serious work in insolvency practice. Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, however, allows a special law to prescribe a different period and to exclude sections 4 to 24 to the extent of any express inconsistency. Section 61(2) fixes its own condonable maximum, and section 5, which permits condonation on sufficient cause without any outer limit, is displaced accordingly.

Section 4 and the Court Vacation Argument

A recurring attempt is to argue that the last day fell during a court closure. Section 4 of the Limitation Act allows a proceeding to be instituted on the day the court reopens where the prescribed period expires on a day when the court is closed. In Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee the Supreme Court considered whether that benefit could carry an appellant past the forty-five day mark and held that it could not: the concession attaches to the prescribed period, not to a discretionary condonable extension. The same distinction had been drawn a few months earlier in My Preferred Transformation and Hospitality Pvt. Ltd. v. Faridabad Implements Pvt. Ltd. [2025 INSC 56], in the context of section 34(3) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Sufficient Cause, and the Date From Which Time Runs

Within the fifteen days the Appellate Tribunal must still be satisfied of sufficient cause, and the standard is not generous. Time spent obtaining a copy of the order, taking legal advice and engaging counsel has been rejected as an explanation. So have technical difficulties with the e-filing portal. An appellant who cannot account for each of the first thirty days is unlikely to be given the fifteen.

The corollary matters more than the case law. The fifteen days is not a buffer to be spent; it is a remedy for something that went wrong, and it has to be explained.

Pronouncement, Uploading and E-filing

Time runs from pronouncement, not from receipt of a copy, and where an order is not pronounced when the hearing concludes, limitation runs from the date it is in fact pronounced or uploaded on the website. The date of pronouncement is excluded under section 12(1) of the Limitation Act. Limitation stops on e-filing rather than on physical filing, which the Supreme Court confirmed in Sanket Kumar Agarwal v. APG Logistics Pvt. Ltd. (Supreme Court of India, 1 May 2023). Time taken by the Tribunal to supply a certified copy is excluded under section 12(2), but only where the appellant applied for one; the mechanics of that application are a separate subject.

The COVID Exclusion Orders as an Instructive Exception

The one period in which the outer limit genuinely moved was the pandemic. By its order of 10 January 2022 in Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020 the Supreme Court restored its earlier directions and excluded the period from 15 March 2020 to 28 February 2022 for the purposes of limitation in all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, with a balance of ninety days from 1 March 2022 where the period would otherwise have expired inside that window.

The instructive part came earlier. In Sagufa Ahmed v. Upper Assam Plywood Products Pvt. Ltd. the Supreme Court held in 2020 that the first of those orders, dated 23 March 2020, extended only the period of limitation and not the further period up to which a tribunal could condone delay. That reading was overtaken when the later orders expressly excluded the period for computing outer limits too. The principle survives the dates: a statutory outer limit moves only when a superior authority says so in terms.

Diary and Escalation Discipline for In-House Counsel

Three people need to know before the day ends: the head of legal, the finance owner of the exposure, and whoever can instruct external counsel to file. In a listed company the company secretary belongs on that list too, since the order may be a disclosable event.

The diary entry should record four dates rather than one: the date of pronouncement, day thirty, day forty-five, and the date by which instructions must be in hand to file by day thirty. Working backwards from day thirty is the single most useful habit available here, because it turns the fifteen day extension into a genuine reserve instead of a planning assumption.

When Approval Has to Come From a Board or a Parent

Instructions are usually slow because someone else has to approve. A board resolution, a parent company sign-off across time zones, or a group litigation committee that meets monthly will each consume most of thirty days if the process starts when the order arrives.

Three fixes work. Obtain standing authority in advance, in the form of a board resolution authorising the general counsel or a named officer to file protective appeals against adverse tribunal orders, with ratification at the next meeting. Separate the appeal decision from the merits decision: file within time and withdraw later if the group decides not to pursue it. Brief external counsel before the order is expected, so that a memorandum of appeal exists in draft while the outcome is still unknown.

None of this is elegant, and it costs money on appeals that are later abandoned. It costs a good deal less than a right extinguished on day forty-six.

What Remains After Forty-Five Days

Can a Party Ask the NCLAT to Recall Its Own Judgment?

The Appellate Tribunal has no power to review its own judgment, but it may recall one in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under rule 11 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Rules, 2016 where a procedural error occurred, for instance where a necessary party was not served or was not before the tribunal when an adverse judgment was delivered. A five member bench drew that line in Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian, and the Supreme Court approved it. Recall does not reach an error of law or fact in the decision itself. It is not a second appeal and it does not repair a missed deadline.

The Writ Route and Section 14 of the Limitation Act

The most recent word is unhelpful to anyone hoping to route around section 61. In Davis Koottala Varkey v. Samson T. George [2026 SCC OnLine SC 1560], decided on 5 August 2026, the Supreme Court set aside an order of the Kerala High Court entertaining a writ petition against a Tribunal order made in liquidation proceedings, holding that judicial discipline requires a High Court ordinarily to refrain from such a challenge where section 61 provides an appeal, and dismissed the petition for alternative remedy.

What the Court did next is the useful part. The forty-five day period had already expired, so it permitted the writ petitioners to approach the Appellate Tribunal within fifteen days with an application under section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking exclusion of the time the proceedings had been pending before the High Court and the Supreme Court. Section 14, which excludes time spent prosecuting a proceeding in good faith before a forum unable to entertain it, remains available to a party that genuinely went to the wrong door. It does nothing for a party that did nothing.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can the NCLAT condone a delay of one day beyond forty-five days under the Code?

No. Section 61(2) permits a maximum extension of fifteen days over the thirty day period, and the Supreme Court held in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee that once the prescribed and condonable periods expire the Appellate Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. A single day beyond forty-five has been refused even where an e-filing portal failure was alleged.

Does section 5 of the Limitation Act help after forty-five days?

No. Section 238A applies the Limitation Act to appeals under the Code only as far as may be, and section 29(2) of the Limitation Act allows a special law to displace sections 4 to 24 by express inconsistency. Section 61(2) fixes its own condonable maximum, so section 5 cannot add to it.

Our last day falls in a court vacation. Does that extend the period?

Only if it is the thirty day period that expires during the closure. Section 4 of the Limitation Act attaches to the prescribed period, not to the fifteen day condonable extension, which is the point decided in Tata Steel Ltd. v. Raj Kumar Banerjee.

When does the clock start if the order was reserved and uploaded weeks later?

From pronouncement. Where no order is pronounced when the hearing concludes, time runs from the date the order is in fact pronounced or uploaded on the website. The date of pronouncement is excluded, and limitation stops on e-filing rather than on physical filing.

The board cannot approve an appeal inside thirty days. What should be done?

Obtain standing authority in advance so that a named officer can file a protective appeal, and take the decision on the merits afterwards. Withdrawing an appeal the group decides not to pursue is straightforward; reviving one filed on day forty-six is not possible.

Does the same forty-five day limit apply to an appeal under the Companies Act?

No. Section 421(3) allows forty-five days from the date a copy of the order is made available, extendable by a further forty-five days on sufficient cause, so the outer limit is ninety days. Do not carry that assumption into an appeal against an order made under the Code.

Is a writ petition an alternative once the appeal is time barred?

Not as a workaround. In Davis Koottala Varkey v. Samson T. George the Supreme Court held that a High Court should ordinarily refrain from entertaining a writ challenge to a Tribunal order appealable under section 61. Where a party genuinely pursued the wrong forum in good faith, section 14 of the Limitation Act may exclude that period, but it is a narrow remedy.

Does the forty-five day limit under section 61(2) apply to cross-objections as well as appeals?

Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 governs the filing of an appeal itself, and the same thirty-plus-fifteen-day structure has been treated as applicable to the filing of an appeal generally before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Parties should treat any responsive filing that functions as an independent challenge to the order with the same discipline as a fresh appeal, and confirm the applicable timeline for the specific filing with counsel rather than assuming a longer period.

What counts as sufficient cause for the fifteen-day extension under section 61(2)?

The threshold is narrow. Delay caused by obtaining a copy of the order, seeking legal advice, or engaging counsel has been rejected as sufficient cause, as have technical difficulties with the e-filing portal. Appellants who succeed typically show an external, unavoidable obstruction, such as illness or a demonstrable failure of the tribunal's own systems, supported by contemporaneous evidence rather than an after-the-fact explanation.

Can an appellant file a memorandum of appeal in draft form and perfect it later, to protect the forty-five day limit?

There is no formal mechanism under section 61(2) to file a placeholder appeal and cure defects afterwards, and defective or incomplete filings run the same risk as no filing at all if the delay in curing the defect pushes the effective filing date beyond the outer limit. The safer practice is to prepare the memorandum of appeal in draft well before an anticipated adverse order, so a complete appeal can be filed promptly once the order is pronounced.

Does the forty-five day limit run separately for each respondent in a multi-party appeal?

No. The limit runs from the date the order is pronounced against the appellant, not from when each respondent is served or joined. An appellant with multiple respondents must still file within forty-five days of pronouncement and can add or correct respondents by application, rather than treating service on a later respondent as extending the filing deadline.

Is the forty-five day period counted in calendar days or working days?

Calendar days. Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963 excludes the day of pronouncement itself from the computation, but the remaining days, including weekends and holidays falling within the period, are all counted. Only where the last day of the prescribed thirty-day period itself falls on a day the tribunal is closed does section 4 of the Limitation Act extend filing to the next working day, and that benefit does not extend to the fifteen-day condonable period.

What should in-house counsel do immediately after an adverse NCLAT-track order is pronounced?

Record the date of pronouncement and calendar the thirtieth and forty-fifth days immediately, obtain internal approval to file well before day thirty rather than waiting for the fifteen-day buffer, and brief external counsel to have a memorandum of appeal ready in draft. Treating the fifteen-day extension as a working assumption rather than a genuine reserve is the single most common cause of a time-barred appeal.

Vikrant D. Shetty | Vikrant D. Shetty leads the Insolvency and Arbitration Practice at the law firm Vikrant D. Shetty & Associates, Advocates & Solicitors which advises financial creditors, operational creditors, and corporate debtors in proceedings before the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT), Mumbai Bench.

Related reading: the treatment of disputed operational creditor claims at the admission stage under the IBC.

This article is for general informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice. For advice specific to your situation, please seek direct consultation with an advocate.